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1. Introduction
A characteristic feature of the African economy in the 1990s was the speed with which
governments extricated themselves from direct ownership and management of businesses.
Although the process was part of a global trend, it has tended to have larger economic and
political connotations in Africa than elsewhere (Bennel 1997, Drum 1993). This is because,
outside the former socialist bloc, African governments had embraced state ownership of
the formal economy much more strongly than other parts of the world.1 This attempt at
controlling the ‘commanding heights’ coincided with severe external shocks, however, and
was not sustainable. The structural adjustment programmes that were embarked on in the
1980s presented an alternative approach based on less intrusive government, and with
privatization and the restructuring of state-owned enterprises seen as important for the
success of economic reform.
Privatization implies the transfer of ownership from the public to the private sector, as well
as changes in income flows between groups. It has thus important socioeconomic
implications for the various interest groups, not least the bureaucratic elite. Thus politically
and in terms of administrative resources, privatization and public sector reforms have been
more demanding than the ‘stroke of the pen’ measures such as exchange rate and price
reforms, which brought about macroeconomic stability. Furthermore, in recent years,
donors and multilateral agencies have made privatization a key conditionality. Indeed more
African countries undertook privatization in an effort to assuage donor fears over domestic
reform commitment than out of ideological or economic conviction. Privatization thus
touches on a complex set of issues, including property rights, nationality, ethnicity,
bureaucratic practices, donor conditionality, nature of markets and politics.
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the factors affecting the implementation of
privatization in sub-Saharan Africa. Anecdotal evidence suggests that there have been wide
differences in the way privatization strategies and plans have been introduced, debated and
executed in Africa. While some governments quickly overcame opposition to privatization
from influential groups, such as labour unions and consumer groups, and were able to sell
off the bulk of the parastatals, others failed to go much beyond the initial divesture of small
companies or the return of shares acquired during earlier nationalizations. Ironically, it is
not always the capitalist-oriented African economies such as Kenya and the Côte d’Ivoire,
which are the most keen privatizers. Formerly socialist-oriented ones such as Mozambique
and Tanzania have been faster in implementing privatization.2
Among the questions addressed in this paper are the following: What strategies have been
used to initiate privatization, especially in light of domestic opposition? Which factors
have influenced the evolution of the privatization debate in the various countries and what
impact has this had on the pace of implementation? Why have some countries kept a steady
1 See for example the article in Africa Analysis, October 18, 1996:4, ‘Selling off the icons of state socialism’.
2 Two reasons can be given for this. First, state-owned companies in Tanzania and Mozambique were close
to bankruptcy and had lost their original purpose of bolstering domestic employment and generating
government revenue. The second point, also advanced in the text, regards the need by governments to send
signals to domestic and foreign investors that a new page had been turned.2
course in implementing privatization, while in others the process has stagnated or failed
altogether? Which issues have emerged as privatization evolved from the divesture of
small firms to that of large corporations and how have they been resolved?3 In other words
is there a ‘privatization learning curve’, if so how have the transition costs, political as well
as economic, been addressed?
2. Theoretical overview
Theoretical analyses project two main views on privatization. The normative view is that
privatization is necessary to curb waste, raise economic efficiency and develop the
activities of the private sector via increased domestic and foreign investment.4. The main
driving force being the eradication of the ‘soft budget’ constraints that make public firms a
major cause of fiscal imbalance, as they encourage waste and obstruct the flow of services
(Harsch 2000, Kornai 2000). The normative theory also presupposes benevolent
governments and politicians. The latter are assumed to be altruistic, their main concern
being to maximize aggregate welfare. They are willing to abandon a discretionary system
for one where market forces determine performance. Since the welfare benefits of
privatization take time to realize, however, the normative view provides a long-term
rationale for public sector divestment, since the process is in the context not as important
the outcomes.
The point of departure for the positive view is that in sub-Saharan Africa, as is many other
developing countries, privatization is a politically charged subject. This relates to the
agency and credibility problems that are unleashed by the exercise as well as its income
distribution implications. In managing state-owned enterprises, politicians and bureaucrats
enjoy rents and are also able to exercise political patronage, for example, creation of jobs
for their supporters as well as targeting credit and other benefits to them. In turn they are
assured re-election or other means of retaining power. Why then would politicians that are
pursuing group-interests and, under them, bureaucrats with discretionary powers, be
willing to commit to a privatization policy that does not favour particular groups or agree
to the establishment of an impartial regulatory mechanism post-privatization?
The answer from the positive theory is that privatization only goes ahead when politicians
see in it clear-cut economic and political benefits. In their application of the model on sub-
Saharan Africa, Laffont and Meleu (1999) conclude that the speed of privatization is
directly related to the shares that politicians or their relatives can fetch in the privatized
firms to compensate themselves for the loss of the rents previously enjoyed under state
ownership. Similarly, interest groups or constituencies, depending on the amount of
political influence they wield, can also affect the speed and sequence of privatization (see
Table 1). Thus governments could end up maximizing group than aggregate welfare. For
example, since the divestiture of loss making state-owned enterprises implicitly lowers the
3 This concern is altogether different from that related to how to ensure that privatization contributes to
private sector development.
4 For example on announcing its privatization/divestiture programme in 1992, the Government of the
Republic of Kenya listed the following objectives for privatization: Enhance the role of the private sector in
the economy; enhance efficiency and the use of the scarce resources; rationalise the operations of the public
enterprise sector; improve the regulatory environment; broaden the base of ownership and enhance capital
market development; reduce the fiscal burden on government; raise revenue for the government.3
tax burden, privatization rewards taxpayers, often the middle classes, while reducing the
rents and employment opportunities enjoyed by senior bureaucrats and other public sector
employees.5 There is thus a trade-off between the goals of economic efficiency postulated
by the normative approach and the issues of income distribution and voter maximization of
the positive approach (Gupta 1998, Talley 1998).
Table 1
Interest groups, threats and benefits in the privatization process
Interest groups Potential Threats/Benefits
1. Government leaders and their representatives
on boards of the state owned companies, as well
as bureaucrats in the line ministries.
Threats include possible loss of political
patronage and income. On the other hand,
privatization reduces the fiscal burden and
sends positive signals to the donor
community.
2. Parastatal managers and employees Risk of loss of employment and income
during privatization and post-privatization
restructuring.
3. Participants in the markets for goods and
services: consumers, suppliers of inputs,
financiers, competitors, etc.
Since many parastatals were moribund pre-
privatization, their divesture tends to
increase market activities, benefiting
participants. However, even non-performing
parastatals still received huge subsidies
from government. Their loss affected some
groups seriously.
4. Influential domestic groups—including political
parties, religious leaders, labour unions,
parliamentarians, academics, etc.
The unequal distribution of privatization
benefits as well as ‘foreignization’ are seen
as threats by a large number of groups ex
ante. Still, an expanding private sector soon
begets its own support groups and views
change rapidly ex post.
5. Donors and multilateral agencies On the whole, donors and multilateral
agencies see no threats in privatization, only
benefits. To them privatization signals
commitment on the part of national
policymakers to economic reform and to
efficiency in government.
Source: author’s compilation
However, bureaucratic collusion and political patronage need not be the only spur to
privatization. As already noted, privatization was undertaken in many African countries as
a direct response to demands from the donor community and the multilateral agencies to
5 Avishur (2000) has argued that privatization might not amount to a pareto-dominating mode of operation.
Note, however, that in Uganda, the ‘privatization’ of coffee marketing greatly improved peasant incomes in
the coffee growing regions of the country thus reducing poverty.4
get governments out of business. Indeed in Kenya and Zambia the privatization of key
companies was made a key precondition for further financial assistance. There is one
important reason why donors would have influence in the context. The inflow of aid keeps
government bureaucracies operative and sometimes even increases their activities and
wages. It can also be argued that for many regimes, for example those that had forcefully
nationalized or expropriated properties belonging to multinationals and non-indigenous
groups, as in Uganda in the early 1970s, privatization became a means of signalling the end
of the old ways and the beginning of legality. That governments were tying their own
hands, for the sake of private sector development, also indicates how weak they had
become compared to the 1960s, for example (Kumssa 1996, Okara 2000).
3. Learning to privatize
Even after privatization, as a concept, has been internalized by policymakers, debate often
continues around issues like the divestiture sequence, size of the firms to be sold and the
speed at which privatization is to be undertaken, as well as the method to be used. In many
countries in Africa, the divestiture of small firms, almost exclusively sold to ‘nationals’ or
simply liquidated, elicits little controversy, even when the companies end up in the hands
of bureaucrats and politicians. It is the privatization of large companies, especially those
thought to be ‘strategic’ that leads to controversy. First, these comparisons are often too
big for domestic capitalists to afford and thus end up in foreign ownership. Second, the
concept of ‘sunk costs’ is not well appreciated by the general population and the
politicians. They expect large state-owned enterprises to be worth at least a good fraction
of the millions spent on their rehabilitation or on loans to them by the government. The
sale of ‘national treasures’ at ‘distress’ prices causes much political dissatisfaction. In
deference to this, many African governments embarked on privatization with lists of
companies that were to remain in state ownership. In the case of Uganda the list included,
among others, the government-owned newspaper the new vision, the national airline and
the Uganda Electricity Board, an electricity utility monopoly. It is an illustration of how
fast the process has evolved since the early 1990s that none of the above firms remain on
the priority list, with Uganda Airlines in de facto liquidation.





Small Stalemate Path of least resistance
Slow Fast Speed of
Privatization
Note: identifying four modes of privatization5
With the help of Figure 1, we portray the evolution of the privatization process for a typical
group of sub-Saharan countries. On the vertical axis of Figure 1 is the accumulated volume
of sales in an appropriate currency, say US$. This ranges from the proceeds of ‘small’
businesses with fewer than five employees to ‘large’ corporations employing thousands of
workers. On the horizontal axis is the speed of privatization, measured as the time it takes
to achieve a given volume of sales. It could be ‘slow’, which for convenience also includes
no activity, or ‘fast’.
A. Stalemate describes a position of minimal movement, with slow privatization and a
small volume of sales. This was the case for many African countries in the late 1980s,
before the privatization process achieved momentum. But owing to social strife and
political difficulties, some countries have not moved far from here.
B. The ‘path of least resistance’ refers to a scenario, quite common in sub-Saharan Africa,
where governments embarked on rapid privatization of small firms, but bulked when it
came to large companies. This was, for example, the experience of Zambia during the
first 5 years of privatization in the 1990s when close to 200 companies were divested
and the government was praised by donors and the multilateral agencies for
undertaking one of the fastest and most transparent privatizations in Africa (Kayizzi-
Mugerwa 2001). The Zambian government claimed at the time that when it came to
privatization there were ‘no sacred cows’. However, altogether the companies sold thus
far were only worth a fraction of the assets of the Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines
(ZCCM), the mining conglomerate, whose privatization was long-drawn out and
controversial and not completed until the end of the 1990s.6
Eventually, the stock of small firms in the ‘path of least resistance’ phase are exhausted
and governments must resort to privatizing larger ones. At about this time, the
privatization process begins to generate its own dynamics. This is partly a process of
learning from earlier mistakes, strengthening the administrative and financial aspects
of the process, including the introduction of new legal codes to remove loopholes.
C. The third phase of privatization in Figure 1 can be referred to as ‘breaking resistance’.
This characterised the bulk of sub-Saharan countries in the first half of the 1990s. At
this stage, privatization has been accepted in principle, and institutional and legislative
modalities for its implementation are in place, but owing to institutional and political
constraints, for example as symbols of national independence larger firms have
considerable sentimental value in Africa, privatization is much slower than before. The
political mood is still against the divestiture of large companies. Some governments
were able to privatize one or two large companies, for example, Kenya Airways in the
mid 1990s and the electricity conglomerate (CIE) in Côte d’Ivoire in 1990 via the issue
of a 10-year lease contract to a French company. While often making little headway
6 The slow process of privatising ZCCM eventually led to an aid embargo on Zambia by donors and the
multilateral agencies. Post-privatization restructuring of the mines has been slow. Ironically, the former Chief
Executive of ZCCM was made the chair of a committee put in place to privatise it, probably partly explaining
the turns and twists of the process.6
otherwise, the privatization of a big company helps break resistance. The privatization
of ‘national treasures’ is no longer impossible, becoming just a question of time.7
D. The last phase, so far only reached by a few African countries, involves a more fully-
fledged privatization effort, including firms formerly considered strategic in sectors
such as telecommunications, electricity, water and other utilities. The phase is reached
when political and institutional constraints to privatization have been resolved,
enabling rapid divestiture, with big companies coming on stream relatively quickly and
with sales to foreigners causing little or no controversy. This phase differs from the
‘big bang’ privatization that was common in the transition economies of Eastern
Europe, notably the voucher privatization schemes in Russia, the Czech Republic and
to a lesser extent Poland. The rationale there was that for reasons of fairness every
citizen had to be given an equal share of the former property of the state. For the ‘big
bang’ to succeed, however, central bureaucracies, such as those of the post-socialist era
in Eastern Europe, must have suffered serious credibility problems making it difficult
for them to defend themselves against the serious onslaught on their incomes and rents
implied by the rapid diminution of the public sector. Voucher privatization has not
been attempted in sub-Saharan Africa. Under the fully-fledged privatization phase
governments have more experience and are able to make the necessary adjustments,
notably with respect to strengthening the legal framework. Typically, the debate
regarding the rationale for privatization has at this stage been transcended, with the
focus now on how the benefits of privatization are allocated.8
4. The privatization process in sub-Saharan Africa
In this section, we use the framework discussed above to analyse issues arising during the
privatization process. We look specifically at the stages of initiation, consolidation and
fully-fledged privatization. The factors determining performance during each of these
phases as well as the transition from one to the other will be illustrated using examples and
data from a range of sub-Saharan countries, although the experiences of Côte d’Ivoire,
Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia will form the core of the
discussion.
4.1 Factors at initiation
Privatization and public sector reforms mark what have been termed ‘second generation’
adjustment policies, an attempt at distinguishing them from the ‘first generation’ policies,
which focused almost exclusively on economic stabilization. In most sub-Saharan African
countries, privatization was embarked on after pressure from the donor community, rarely
7The notion of what was strategic has changed radically over the years. While utilities, railways and airlines
had been declared strategic in the late 1980s when the privatization process began, and thus to be retained,
few areas if any were still designated as such by the late 1990s.
8 The latter has proven to be an important issue. Few governments had a good strategy for using the money
that privatization generated. In Uganda some of the privatization proceeds were lent to companies in the
private sector to improve their operations. Sales proceeds were also used to ‘fatten’ other companies before
sale or to pay off workers. There was inevitably considerable confusion, which eventually led to direct
intervention by Parliament.7
was it a result of own policy initiative (Appiah-Kubi 2001).9 Still, when privatization
began a number of domestic factors came into play. As a result some privatization episodes
were relatively smooth while others were drawn out and controversial, in some cases
forcing the government to postpone or cancel the process altogether.
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are often an amorphous group of companies covering most
sectors of the economy, acquired under a variety of political ambitions and held together
by a number of statutes and legal provisions. The bulk of SOEs, not only utility companies
supplying electricity, water, transport and telecommunications but also huge mining
companies, were inherited from the colonial governments at independence. However,
governments then acquired whole or partial stakes in multinationals and other foreign-
owned companies during the ‘socialist’ revolutions of the 1960s and 1970s. This included
areas such as banking, transport, agriculture, mining and manufacturing.
While in most countries nationalization was completed after protracted negotiations with
incumbent owners, with governments compensating them for their nationalized assets, in
the case of Zambia even borrowing on international markets in order to do so, there were a
number of exceptions. In Mozambique, nationalization was a result of the assumption of
power of the socialist guerrilla movement (Frelimo), which saw private ownership as
synonymous with Portuguese alienation and something to be eliminated entirely (Pitcher
1996). The properties left behind by the fleeing Portuguese settlers were nationalized en
masse. In Tanzania, following the declaration of socialism in the second half of the 1960s,
a similar nationalization of businesses took place, with the government or cooperatives
ending up with much more of the smaller businesses than in neighbouring countries.
Uganda provides yet another variation. In the early 1970s the military government expelled
citizens of non-African origin, with Asian business families being the main target, and
expropriated all their properties with little or no compensation. However, unlike in
Mozambique and Tanzania, the smaller businesses were acquired by indigenous Ugandans
that were close to the political leadership, only the bigger businesses were taken over by
the state.10
Governments also set up their own companies, seeing it as an important means of
providing dynamism to their economies. It would help create employment, while enabling
governments to ensure regional balance in economic development. SOEs were created in a
number of areas including airlines, banking, insurance and tourism. In francophone Africa
in particular, perhaps as a legacy of metropolitan France itself, state ownership became
quite entrenched. In Côte d’Ivoire, for example, a country generally considered capitalist in
orientation, the government still holds extensive business holdings in most areas of the
economy. This policy stance resembles that of Kenya. In both countries, state ownership of
businesses has not excluded multinational corporations and private individuals from
holding large stakes in the economy, although there have been complaints over lopsided
competition.
9 Only Zambia, under the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD), had embarked on the privatization
exercise of own volition.
10 In Uganda, regime shifts also meant a reallocation of the businesses acquired from the departed Asians.
Indeed the businesses became an important source of patronage. This also meant that the security of tenure
was tenuous and the businesses attracted little investment (see Bigsten and Kayizzi-Mugerwa 1999).8
4.2 Evolution of the privatization debate
In most African countries privatization has been superseded by serious debate. The
exchange between politicians, bureaucrats and other stakeholders has sometimes been
acrimonious, while the conditionality attached to privatization by donors and multilateral
agencies has caused sharp disagreement.
African governments had heralded the nationalizations of the 1960s and 1970s as marking
the real beginning of independence. Beside political independence, Africans would also
control their economies for the first time. Thus although many of the businesses acquired
by governments were very poorly run, with low capacity utilisation and serious
dependence on state subsidies, SOEs were seen as national possessions worth preserving in
the public realm.11 However, although state ownership of the larger companies could be
justified on the grounds of scale economies, employment creation and regional balance,
governments had gone well beyond ‘strategic’ considerations in acquiring businesses. This
was because in many of them nationalization was equated with indigenisation, with
businesses belonging to foreign-born ethnic minorities especially targeted for take-over.
During privatization, the foreign ownership debate has thus returned, with governments
trying to ensure that indigenous Africans, get a ‘fair’ share of the assets on sale. Apart from
the small enterprises, governments have not been in a position to tilt the ownership
structure in favour of Africans, however. There was no attempt to adopt the voucher-type
privatizations of Eastern Europe, named earlier, while the stock exchanges, which would
have provided an alternative means of privatization, remain small and fragile.
While privatization seems irreversible in many countries in Africa, local opinion still refers
to it as a loss of ‘resources to abroad’, ‘foreignization’ and ‘loss of independence’. In
Uganda, which has gone further than most other sub-Saharan African countries in its
privatization efforts, President Museveni has made an insightful analysis of the politics of
the process (Museveni 1993). He argues that simply because his government was returning
assets to their former Indian owners and selling off large companies to foreign companies
and individuals is not reason enough to claim that Uganda was ‘being sold to foreigners’.
He notes that the ‘local middle class’ that propagate this view are not in a position to
purchase the assets on sale and the government has no money to lend them. He concludes
that the tension is not surprising since in his estimation the national interest rarely
coincides with the interest of the ‘local middle class’.
The second area of contention relates to who should determine the pace, extent and depth
of privatization. As already noted, the multilateral agencies and donor community are very
much involved in the implementation of privatization in many African countries. They help
set up and finance the institutional structure for privatization and ensure that the process
remains on track by attaching it to their overall conditionality. In the earlier phases of
privatization, it was generally felt that donors had much more influence on the process than
domestic actors. In Uganda, for example, members of parliament argued that while they
considered privatization a fait accompli, they worried about how little influence they and,
11 For example at the beginning of privatization in Mozambique in the late 1980s, only 42 percent of the
companies were operational. However, many of these were operating at a very low level of capacity
utilisation (see Unidade Técnica para a Reestraturacão de Empresas, various issues).9
by analogy their constituents, had had on the process as a whole (UMACIS, 1998). Labour
unions in many African countries had been so weakened by the economic crisis of the
1970s and 1980s that they were not able to resist privatization via strikes or other industrial
action.
The third sources of controversy relates to the valuation of assets and the use to which the
proceeds are put. As already noted, although many of the enterprises were non-operational
at the time of privatization, the general public still believed that they were worth much
more the buyers were offering. The secrecy related to the privatization proceedings often
raised public suspicion, leading to charges of collusion, especially when assets were sold
cheaply to ‘foreigners’.
4.3 Setting up the institutional structure for privatization
Although domestic opposition to privatization delayed the process in many countries, a
more serious impediment was lack of an institutional structure for privatization. Even after
reaching a consensus on the need for privatization, it took much longer than expected for
governments to nullify statutes that had sustained state monopolies and put in place an
adequate body of legislation to support privatization, including revisions of laws covering
areas such as taxation, bankruptcy, land ownership, competition and regulation.
The existing legislation for the setting up of the institutional framework for privatization
and public sector reforms was introduced almost simultaneously by many African
countries in the early 1990s, assisted by the donor community. The laws and related
documentation, share a number of common issues for instance explaining why it was
necessary to privatize, commercialize or bring about changes in the operations of SOEs.
The documents and laws also define the structures and powers of the units and institutions
set up, within ministries, or as independent entities, to supervise the privatization and
reform process. However, while the thrust and direction are quite similar, the documents
nevertheless reveal some subtle differences in emphasis across countries, reflecting a
number of political concerns.
In this section we provide a brief review of some of the laws, proclamations and ordnances
introduced by a cross-section of African countries: Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Mozambique,
Tanzania, Togo, Uganda and Zambia. The group exemplifies a range of political and
economic experiences. Ethiopia, Mozambique and Tanzania have in the past pursued a
socialist approach to development, although only the latter was spared the ravages of civil
war, while the rest of the countries in the sample had practised varying forms of state
control, and excepting Zambia were led at some stage by the military. Uganda, in
particular, had gone through over a decade of political and economic chaos in the 1970s
and 1980s. In this section we look at the legislation setting up the privatization structures in
the individual countries and the extent to which affirmative issues were taken into account
(see Table 2).
The objective of the newly created agencies was ‘to carry out the process of privatizing
public enterprises in an orderly and efficient manner’ (Government of Ethiopia 1994).
However, few countries gave the agencies complete autonomy, while the composition of
their boards was steered to a large extent by the governments themselves. For example,
although the Ethiopian Privatization Agency was to be an autonomous agency with its
‘own legal personality’, its five permanent board members were designated by the10
government and it was accountable to the Prime Minister in all matters. Moreover, the
government would designate five permanent members to its board. With respect to interest
group representation, the chairman of the board of the enterprise under privatization as
well as the worker representative sitting on its board were allowed to represent the
company during the Agency’s negotiations for its sale.
A similarly centralized approach to privatization was evident in Ghana in the early 1990s
(Republic of Ghana 1993). The purpose of the Divesture Implementation Committee was
defined as ‘to implement and execute all Government policies in respect of divesture
programs’. All the Committee’s recommendations were submitted to the Provisional
National Defence Council (PNDC) for approval. The latter appointed the members of the
Committee whose chairman and executive secretary were PNDC members. Other members
included a representative from the trade unions, the Ghana Armed Forces, and the
Committee for the Defence of the Revolution.
In Guinea the Minister of State Assets assumed authority over the privatization exercise,
signing transfer documents on behalf of the government and supervising the work of the
Privatization Committee. A representative from the Ministry of State Assets, would chair
the Committee, which would comprise two representatives from the ministry where the
enterprise on sale ‘belonged’, a representative from the Association of Bankers and two
representatives from the Chambers of Commerce of Agriculture and Industry of Guinea.
Although there was no explicit representation on the Privatization Committee for workers,
the Committee was admonished to keep the labour unions ‘informed of the progress of the
privatization process’.
The Kenyan and Tanzanian privatization legislation is light compared to other sub-Saharan
African examples (Republic of Kenya 1992, Republic of Tanzania 1992, 1993). These
more modest models contrast sharply with that of Mozambique. To get the privatization
process started there required five decrees, three laws and a ‘ministerial diploma’ as well as
the creation of layers of institutions at the national and provincial levels. The process is
also marked by considerable affirmative action to ensure that Mozambicans benefit.
Togolese privatization also favoured a centralized approach, with the minister in charge of
public enterprises having the main responsibility. The privatization committee, comprised
mainly of officials chosen by Cabinet decree, would consult the Minister on each
operation, including justifying the choice of object for privatization as well as on the nature
of the negotiations and their conclusion.Table 2
Legal and institutional structures for privatization: board composition of the agency and the affirmative action content of the legislation
Country Laws and policy declarations Board composition of the privatization agency Affirmative action
Ethiopia Ethiopian Privatization Agency
Establishment Proclamation No.87/
1994; Establishment of the Board of
Trustees of Privatized Public
Enterprises Proclamation No. 17/
1996.
The Privatization Agency has 5 permanent members
designated by the government. When a company is in the
process of privatization the chairman of its board and the
worker representative on the board would participate in the
Agency’s deliberations, as non-voting members.
The proclamations establishing the Privatization Agency
as well as the Board of Trustees for Privatized Public
Enterprises make no explicit mention of the need to
favour Ethiopian nationals in the privatization process.
Ghana Ghana Divesture of State Interests
(Implementation) Law, 1993, esta-
blishes a Divestiture Implementa-
tion Committee.
A Chairman who had to be a member of the then ruling
Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC). A
representative each from the following: Trade Union
Congress, Ghana Armed Forces, and Committee for the
Defence of the Revolution, plus 3 other people chosen on the
basis of their ‘experience or specialised knowledge’. The
Executive Secretary of the Committee was automatically a
member. All members of the committee were to be elected
by the PNDC i.e. the government.
No explicit affirmative action provisions are made by the
Divestiture Law.
Guinea Loi L93 fixant les regles de la
privitisation des enterprises publi-
ques, 1993 sets up a Privatization
Committee.
A representative of the Minister for State Assets, 2
representatives from the Ministry to which the company
belongs, a representative from the Association of
Professional Bankers, and 2 representatives from the
Chambers of Commerce (Agriculture and Industry). The
mandate of the members would be enforced by decree.
Article 8, of the Law of 1993, states that the privatization
should be conducted with national interests in mind.
Measures in support of the employees of the privatized
companies, including their acquisition of some of the
shares, had to be put in place, while labour unions had to
be consulted frequently during the process.
1
1Kenya Policy Paper on Public Enterprise
Reform, 1992, announces
creation of Parastatal Reform
Programme Committee (PRPC),
with Executive Secretariat and
Technical Unit (ESTU) as
implementing agency.
The board membership of PRPC and ESTU is not specified
although the Vice President was to head the former at
initiation. The work of the two agencies would be ‘insulated
from any Government or political interference’.
With respect to the overall reform of the parastatal sector,
the government refers to the need for safety nets to
counter the effects of labour retrenchment. The reform
measures are also aimed at broadening ownership of
assets in the country.
Mozambique Decrees, Laws, and a Ministerial




with an Executive Privatization
Commi-ssion (CEP) for each large
company. National and provincial
agencies created for smaller firms.
CEP membership includes the following: One representative
from Ministry of Planning and Finance, Bank of Mozambique,
the Ministry where the company belongs, a union
representative. All are nominated by the Prime Minister.
For purchase of bigger companies, favourable interest
rates are offered to nationals. They can also mortgage up
to 60 percent of the acquired asset before full payment.
Acquisition of smaller firms is faster and tilted in favour of
nationals.
Tanzania Amendment of Public
Corporations Act 1992, in 1993
creates Parasta-tal Sector Reform
Commission.
The President, upon advice from the Minister of Finance
appoints 7-9 members of the Commission, including
Chairman.
Affirmative action not explicit.
Togo Ordonnance No 94 002/PR
Portant Desengagement de L’Etat
et D’Autres Personnes Morales de
Droit Public Des Entreprises,
1994.
9 members, including the Chairman, to be nominated by
decree of the council of Ministers
A hierarchy for privatization specified: firm employees,
Togolese persons (physical and legal), similarly for
WAEMU countries and ECOWAS. A key goal being ‘to
protect national interest’.
Uganda The Public Enterprises Reform Members of DRIC included: Minister of Finance as Chair, No explicit affirmative action imbedded in PERD statute,
1
2and Divesture (PERD) Statute,
1993 (Revised 1998), establishes
a Divestiture and Reform
Impleme-ntation Committee
(DRIC), the Privatization Unit (PU)
and a Parastatal Monitoring Unit
(PMU).
Attorney General, Minister for Privatization, Chairman of the
Parliamentary Committee on Economy, Chairman of
Parliamentary Committee on Parastatals, Chairman Uganda
Investment Authority, 3 eminent Ugandans who are nor
ministers. All are government appointees.
although among its objectives was included: ‘the
promotion of local entrepreneurship’.
Zambia The Privatization Act, 1992, sets
up the Zambia Privatization
Agency.
Board members include: permanent secretary ministry of
commerce, trade and industry; permanent secretary ministry
of finance; the Attorney General; a representative each from
Zambia Congress of Trade Unions; Zambia Federation of
Employers; the Law Association of Zambia; the Zambia
Institute of Certified Accountants; the Dean of the School of
Business of the Copperbelt University, Churches in Zambia;
Bankers Association of Zambia; the farmers. The
Chairperson and the deputy would be elected from among its
members. Members would be chosen by a Select Committee
of the National Assembly, ratified by the National Assembly
and appointed by the President.
The government may retain a share in any privatized
enterprise and could convert it into a golden share.
Related to this is the establishment of a Privatization
Trust Fund, in which government would hold shares to be
purchased later by Zambians. Citizens could also be
offered shares (small number) a discount, while
management and employees wishing to buy into the state
owned company would be able to pay for shares by
instalments.
Source: World Bank: Privatization Transaction Data; national sources
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In Uganda, the Public Enterprises Reform and Divesture (PERD) Statute came into force
on October 8, 1993, establishing the Divesture and Reform Implementation Committee
(DRIC) (Republic of Uganda 1993). It consisted of the Finance Minister, as chairperson,
the Attorney General, and the Minister responsible for the parastatal on sale. It also
included chairpersons of parliamentary committees on the economy and the parastatals, the
executive director of the Uganda Investment Authority and three ‘prominent Ugandans’,
not ministers, appointed by the cabinet. The PERD differed from the privatization and
reform statutes presented above in that it also laid out the complete portfolio of Ugandan
SOEs from the outset, dividing it into four groups: those in which the state would continue
to have 100 percent ownership; those in which the state would require majority
shareholding in the future; enterprises to be fully divested; and enterprises to be liquidated.
The PERD Statute was revised in 1997 to improve the transparency of the privatization
process and increase the private sector’s representation on the Committee. The number of
parastatals slated for outright privatization was also increased, while those to remain in
government control was reduced drastically.
Unlike many African countries, where the authorities or ruling parties only decided to
undertake privatization after pressure from donors and the multilateral agencies, Zambia’s
own privatization effort was part of the ruling Movement for Multiparty Democracy’s
(MMD) election manifesto. After election into power in 1991, the MMD embarked on a
rapid process of enacting laws and institutions to enable the process to go ahead.
Parliament passed the Privatization Act in July 1992, while the Zambian Privatization
Agency was established two months later (Republic of Zambia 1992). The agency’s board
would include 12 members, drawn from as many interest groups as possible, appointed by
the president of the country but subject to scrutiny by a select committee of the national
assembly as well as to the assembly’s ratification. the breadth of the board, including
representatives from the churches as well as labour unions, is credited with Zambia’s
success with the earlier phase of its privatization programme.
Turning briefly to the question of affirmative action, that is to ensure that nationals are
favoured in the acquisition of the assets on sale, it is not as emphasised as one would have
expected, and even then more by implication. The Kenyan document, for example, refers
to the need to ‘broaden ownership of businesses’ and Ugandan ones to ‘the promotion of
local entrepreneurship’ as a goal of privatization. Notably, Ethiopia, Ghana and Tanzania,
both with long experiences of collectivism have no explicit affirmative statements in their
legislative statements on privatization, which is of course not to say that policymakers did
not have any such ambitions in mind.
The privatization laws from francophone Guinea and Togo (Republique de Guinée 1993,
Republique Togolaise 1994) are thus significant in their insistence on enabling citizens to
acquire some of the businesses on sale. For example, Article 8 of the privatization law of
the Republic of Guinea, states explicitly that privatization should ‘safeguard the national
interest’ and protect the social wellbeing of the workers in the privatized firms. Moreover,
‘labour unions should be involved in discussions related to the treatment of workers in the
privatized industries’. Further, the law demands that the privatization committee set aside
enterprises for acquisition by Guineans.12
12 This right would, however, be valid for a limited period only, after which the companies would revert to
the common pool. The legal texts have been translated freely by the author from the French original (see the
references).15
In the case of Togo, the Privatization Committee is charged with setting up a priority list
which would have the first right of refusal on the assets on sale: notably, employers
wishing to take over management of a company, individuals or legal persons of Togolese
origin, individuals or legal persons from the West African Economic and Monetary Union
(WAEMU), or individuals and legal persons from the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS). In a similar law, but drafted earlier by the Senegalese
government, the need to reserve shares for employees who wished to participate in the
process was emphasised, significantly even employees who had since retired were to be
included.13 Mozambique also has a strong affirmative element, with nationals able to
mortgage up to 60 percent of an acquired asset before even paying it off.
With respect to collision of interests, which sub-Saharan African experience has shown to
lie at the centre of the privatization process, legislation has been mild or silent. Here also,
the Guinean privatization is significant, taking a tough line on abuse of office by members
of the Privatization Committee. For example those that accept payment or seek
employment or other benefits in the privatized companies would be liable to imprisonment
and a large fine.14 In comparison, the Togolese privatization law named above, for
example, only refers to the need for ‘professional secrecy and integrity’ in the work of the
Committee members, with no legal consequences indicated for transgression. The Ugandan
law (Republic of Uganda 1993) on the other hand demands (Article 7) that Committee
members with ‘direct personal interest’ in the matter being considered should as soon as
possible ‘disclose the nature’ of this interest to the Committee and not partake in decisions
relating to it. There are, even here, no sanctions specified for any transgressing the
provision.
What can be concluded from the above examples is that governments were well aware of
the political implications and serious conflicts of interest implied by the privatization
exercises. The response to these challenges, not only in the drafting of privatization laws,
but also in implying them, very much depended on the politics of the individual countries,
the history of past ownership structures and the extent of donor leverage.
5. Privatization in practice
As already noted, privatization is not a uniform process, not least because of its politicised
nature. Comparisons among countries are also made difficult by the differences in methods
used to privatize. Among the methods used to privatize companies have been direct sale,
usually via tender or direct negotiation, public offer (via the stock exchange), joint venture,
lease, for example of hotels in national parks, sale of assets, and liquidation. Moreover,
governments have tended to bunch up their sales, for example selling hotels, banks or
textile companies at about the same time. The need to prepare sector strategies and legal
documents also tends to bring the affected companies on stream at about the same time.
Table 3 indicates that direct sale has been the most common method used, 100 percent in
the case of Mozambique, although stock exchanges, well developed only in Kenya, Ghana
13 See ‘Loi 87-23 du Août 1987 Portant privitisation d’entreprises’, of the Republic of Senegal.
14 For example, the fine for taking advantage of knowledge gained in the exercise of duties on the
Privatization Committee would lie between CFA 5-10 million (that is, up to US$15,000).16
and Nigeria, in the sample countries, have been used. In Kenya, the sale of Kenyan
Airways was partly undertaken via the stock exchange as well as that of a commercial
bank. Nigeria undertook 72 percent of its privatization via the stock exchange, although
generally its privatization rate has been slow, to be characterised as being in the ‘breaking
resistance’ phase.
Table 3






































































































Côte d’Ivoire 24 76
Ghana 4 89 5 2
Kenya 35 44 21
Mozambique 100
Nigeria 72 28
Tanzania 6 53 21 10 10
Uganda 2 86 6 2 4
Zambia 87 6 7
Source: World Bank: Privatization Transaction Data; national sources
Note: direct sale here also includes restricted tender, public tender and negotiated tender, auction and
management buy out.
While liquidations featured in a number of countries, they have only been significant in
Kenya. It can also be argued that since liquidated companies are written off the books, this
might be an easy way for bureaucrats to get hold of the assets cheaply, without rousing
political interest. Tanzania has undertaken more joint ventures than other countries in the
sample. Besides the fact that its stock exchange is quite new and unable to cater for large
transactions, joint ventures reflect the latent resistance to fully-fledged privatization by the
Tanzanian bureaucrats (Due 1995, Due et al. 2000). Zambia is the only country recording
cases of management buy-outs, with many of these involving companies providing
services to the mining industry on the Copperbelt. In both Uganda and Zambia,
privatization has also included restitution of companies to their original owners. As argued
earlier, privatization enabled these countries to erase their history of private property
confiscation in their bid to attract investors.
Tables 4 and 5 present privatization outcomes for a sample of African countries over a
decade. While Mozambique has undertaken by far the largest number of privatization over
the 1990s, it is important to note that it has also had one of the largest holdings of state-
owned enterprises in Africa. When Frelimo took power in the mid 1970s, it simply
annexed the thousands of small businesses and shops owned by the fleeing Portuguese
settlers. During privatization, many of these have been sold cheaply to nationals, as part of
the country’s affirmative action. Thus in spite of the large number of firms for sale, the
government has, perhaps intentionally, realized modest revenues from privatization. It
might also be the case that privatization, coming after a long period of civil war, was seen17
as a part of the post-war reconstruction by policymakers, maximizing returns was thus not
necessarily the goal (see also Harris and Lockwood 1997).
Table 4

























































































Côte d’Ivoire 1990-6 1995 17 45 17 23 2 24
Ghana 1989-96 1994 82 193 12 52 1.5 9
Kenya 1992-7 1995 65 153 13 61 5 11
Mozambique 1987-96 1994 136 549 21 36 - 6
Nigeria 1989-4 1990 36 60 4 20 30 27
Tanzania 1992-6 1996 34 123 5 45 - 31
Uganda 1991-7 1995 35 85 24 30 3.5 5
Zambia 1993-7 1996 107 213 22 30 2 19
Source: World Bank: Privatization Transaction Data; national sources
Table 5





























































































































Côte d’Ivoire 1990-6 477 70 193 40
Ghana 1989-96 800 71 398 49.8
Kenya 1992-7 170 15 26 15
Mozambique 1987-96 139.7 43 14 10
Nigeria 1989-94 763.4 65 500 65
Tanzania 1992-6 133.9 79 55 41
Uganda 1991-7 151.4 56 20.5 13.5
Zambia 1993-7 417 93 220 52.7
Source: World Bank: Privatization Transaction Data; national sources
Note: *that total sales data refers to amount agreed to at the time of sale. In many countries payment has
been tardy, with some buyers even asking for renegotiation of contracts.
Taken individually, many countries in the sample reached a peak in terms of the number of
companies sold in about the mid 1990s, that is about 5 years after the launch of the
privatization process across the continent. However, in terms of sales value, peaks were not
reached until substantial numbers of the larger companies were privatized towards the end
of the 1990s. The bulk of the companies sold were in the industrial sector, but with a god
number in agriculture and services.18
Table 5 indicates that foreign sales have been important for the returns from privatization.
Excepting Kenya and Mozambique, foreign purchases contributed to over 50 percent of
total sales. This has been marked in Zambia, 93 percent, and Kenya, 79 percent. In a
number of cases a single foreign purchase was worth over 40 percent of total sales, this
includes Ghana’s sale of Ashanti Gold on the London Stock Exchange as well as Zambia’s
sale of part of ZCCM.
Table 6
Major foreign purchases during privatization in a sample of sub-Saharan African countries




















































































































Britain 12 5.1 0.9 10 20 68.2
China 1.5 20
France 24.3 220 500 5.4
India 0.2 20.5 2
Japan 2.8
Germany 39.4








Other 597.2 4 0.4 2.5 17 12
Source: World Bank: Privatization Transaction Data; national sources
Note: for Ghana, the row ‘other’ includes purchases of shares of Ashanti Gold on the London Stock Exchange,
involving a number of institutional investors. For other countries they include mostly purchases of small
companies jointly by local and foreign investors, without specification of the country of origin of the latter.
With respect to the country of origin of the buyers, there has been considerable variation.
Table 6 indicates for example that buyers in Ghana included companies originating from
Britain, France, Germany, Malaysia and the USA. The London Stock Exchange sale of
Ashanti Gold of course implies an even broader participation in Ghana’s privatization
process. Buyers of Ugandan companies are equally diversified. It is only in Côte d’Ivoire
where France is the dominant purchaser, although companies from Britain and Switzerland
have also purchased businesses (Plane 1996). The relatively low diversity of participation
is probably because, compared to Ghana and Uganda for example, Côte d’Ivoire still
retains a huge parastatal sector. The recent political problems in the country have
prevented the implementation of plans, quite advanced in the late 1990s, to embark on19
rapid privatization of the remaining companies, using the regional bourse, which has its
headquarters in Abidjan.
6. Conclusions
Although privatization in Africa did not become the political battleground that many
predicted it would, it nevertheless was opposed by broad groupings in many countries.
That policymakers went ahead nevertheless was initially because they really did not have
much choice given that the donor community demanded it. In many countries economic
assistance was conditioned on the progress made in privatization and public sector reforms.
Domestic resistance was also lighter than expected because many countries were faced
with more pressing concerns, which included the transition to multiparty politics, poverty
eradication and, in some countries, civil war. Moreover, many parastatals performed
poorly, failing to deliver the basic consumer goods and utility services on which their
creation was premised. The official or normative justification for privatization is that it
increases economic efficiency and productivity and thus raises general welfare. However,
African experience indicates that political considerations have also been important
determinants of the pace at which privatization has been designed and implemented.
Politicians went ahead only when they were sure that the benefits to themselves and their
supporters exceeded the costs, including loss of rents, of denationalization. The reasons for
this are threefold.
First, even where net revenues from privatization were modest, the process generated its
own economic and political dynamics. Economically it improved resource flows in the
form of new investment and donor aid, which rejuvenated whole sectors. Politically, the
expansion of economic activities improved government finances and its capacity for
patronage.
Second, privatization helped improve the image of many African governments in the eyes
of foreign and domestic investors. In earlier decades, governments had forcefully
nationalized businesses and properties, of both multinationals and non-indigenous citizens.
Privatization can thus be seen as signalling that past behaviour has been abandoned, with
respect for property rights reinstated.
Third, privatization is not the threat to the politicians that it is sometimes said to be.
Policymakers in many countries as well as their supporters have benefited directly or
indirectly from privatization, by buying up some of the assets on sale or by ensuring
themselves access to the proceeds from privatization. In a number of countries these
economic and political factors have converged positively to ensure a well sequence
privatization process, thereby helping to revive investment as well as overall economic
activity. In many more countries, however, the verdict on privatization is still pending.
Many newly privatized firms have not been able to ‘graduate’ and still depend on or expect
direct and indirect support from the government to survive. Weak internal markets and
vulnerability to foreign competition have turned them into lobbyists for increased
protection.20
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